From Worker to Self-Entrepreneur: The Transformation of <em>Homo Economicus</em> and the Freedom of Movement in the European Union by Kramer, D.
VU Research Portal
From Worker to Self-Entrepreneur: The Transformation of Homo Economicus and the





DOI (link to publisher)
10.1111/eulj.12254
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Kramer, D. (2017). From Worker to Self-Entrepreneur: The Transformation of Homo Economicus and the
Freedom of Movement in the European Union. European Law Journal, 23(3-4), 172-188.
https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12254
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
Received: 5 November 2015 Revised: 8 September 2016 Accepted: 25 July 2017DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12254OR I G I N A L MANU S C R I P TFrom worker to self‐entrepreneur: The
transformation of homo economicus and the
freedom of movement in the European Union
Dion Kramer*Abstract
This paper seeks to make a contribution to the study of personhood in EU free movement law by linking a
historical and doctrinal analysis with the internal transformation of the homo economicus in economic liberalism.
It is argued that a shift can be observed in the government of mobility from “freeing up” the ability of the worker
as a relatively passive subject tied to external economic mechanisms to the targeting of the individual him/herself
as a responsible, active bearer of economic capability or “human capital”, whereby past socio‐economic conduct
and prospective economic activity serve as the thresholds for the entitlement to rights. The essence of the
“new” homo economicus of EU free movement law is situated at the intersection of the social and economic,
serving as a rational frame for the government of the European mover on the basis of a mutual responsibility
between the Union citizen and his/her host Member State towards social and economic activity, self‐sufficiency
and integration.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Since its inception during the 1950s, the project of European integration has worked as a great liberator of cross‐bor-
der human movement. While initially connected to various categories of economic activity, subsequent legislative
effort, the establishment of Union citizenship in particular, and progressive case law of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) have significantly broadened the personal and material scope of free movement rights. Whereas scholarly con-
sensus seems to exist over the fact that early European integration created the legal personality of a “market citizen”,1
intellectual disagreement prevailed over the extent to which “market citizenship” has moved and should move
towards a “real” or “substantial” Union citizenship, even before the Dano turn.2 In an attempt to contribute to recent*PhD Candidate at the Department of Transnational Legal Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. I am grateful to Annette Schrauwen,
Tanja Aalberts, Jessica Lawrence, Bertjan Wolthuis, two anonymous reviewers and the editor of the journal for engaging and some-
times challenging comments on earlier drafts of the article. Errors, however, are my own. Earlier drafts were presented at the Bound-
aries of Law Research Seminar (Amsterdam, 24 June 2016) and the Critical Legal Conference (Kent, 3 September 2016).
1“Market citizenship” is presented as a “reduced functionalist concept of the individual [...] as a holder of economic freedoms, the judi-
cial enforcement of which serves to realise the Common market” or a “fragmented form of mercantile citizenship designed to facilitate
the European integration”. See, respectively, S. Kaldenbach, ‘Union Citizenship’ (2003) 9/03 Jean Monnet Working Paper, 5 and T.
Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal, 623, 625.
2On the one hand, we find scholars who are optimistic as regards a progressive development towards ‘substantial’ citizenship—for
example, see Kostakopoulou, above, n. 1. S. O'Leary, ‘Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship’ (1999) 24 European
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KRAMER 173efforts that explore the construction of personhood and subjectivities in EU law,3 this article seeks to shed a different
light on this debate by focusing on the contingent and internal transformation of the homo economicus as the
anthropological foundation constituting the economic subject of EU free movement law. When treating the homo
economicus not as a constant, but as a dynamic concept which is subject to transformations in knowledge, economic
discourse in particular, one is able to shift the focus of the question.4 Instead of asking whether or not mobility rights
move away from their mobilisation of the market citizen as an actor in the European project, one can ask how its inter-
nally mutable subject, i.e. homo economicus, is reflected in the government of EU free movement.5
It will be argued that the economic personhood of the European mover that appears after the establishment of
Union citizenship and its progressive interpretation by the ECJ, no longer conforms to the homo economicus ascribed
to the early “market citizen”. Instead, it resonates much more strongly with the “new” homo economicus that was
constructed during a fundamental mutation in economic liberalism, i.e. with the shift from classical to neoliberal
economics. Briefly put, this entailed a shift in the government of EU free movement from “freeing up” the ability of
the worker as a relatively passive subject tied to external economic mechanisms to the targeting of the individual
him/herself as a responsible, active bearer of economic capability or “human capital”, whereby past socio‐economic
conduct and prospective economic activity serve as the thresholds for the entitlement to rights. This thesis does
not suggest, however, that EU free movement law has become entirely “neoliberal” or would not be driven by social
objectives, but merely that its economic rationality is increasingly based on a neoliberal anthropology of the human
being. Accordingly, the next section sets the stage by describing the transformation of the homo economicus in liberal
economics in connection to labour, mobility and welfare. Section 3 reveals an image of the mobile “worker” as the
partner of laissez‐faire in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic
Community. Arguing that the “new” homo economicus of EU free movement law becomes especially visible at the
intersection of mobility and the national welfare state, section 4 describes the progressive citizenship case law of
the ECJ with respect to employment, student and social assistance benefits.2 | MOBILITY, WELFARE AND THE (NEO)LIBERAL SUBJECT OF
GOVERNMENT
Before delving into (the history of) EU law in the next sections, this section first succinctly sketches the broader trans-
formation of the homo economicus in liberal government. After discussing the development of liberal economics inLaw Review, 68 and F. Wollenschläger, ‘A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics
for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal, 1. On the other hand, we find scholars
who observe a continuance of the market citizen—for example, M. Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in J. Shaw and G. More
(eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995) 73; N. Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’
(2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, 1597; M. Everson, ‘European Citizenship and the Disillusion of the Common Man’, in R. Nickel
(ed.), Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond (Center for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2009), Arena Report
1/09; and C. O'Brien, ‘I Trade, Therefore I Am: Legal Personhoods in the European Union’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review,
1643. For one critical review—amongst many—of the post‐Dano case law, C. O'Brien, ‘Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding
Principle of EU Free Movement Rights’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review, 937.
3See the various contributions in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places and E. Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles,
Identities (Hart Publishing, 2016). P. Neuvonen, Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law: We The Burden? (Hart Publishing, 2016).
4Most contributions present the homo economicus as a constant. A result of this conception is that the development of Union citizen-
ship is analysed as either a “move away from” or a continuance of the “market citizen”, thereby neglecting the possibility that its active
part, i.e. the homo economicus, is a mutable and contingent construct qua subject of government, hence bearing the potential to recon-
stitute the “market citizen”.
5This approach distinguishes this article from, for example, the recently published contribution by Sankaari and Frerichs in this journal,
who trace the evolutionary path of free movement through the lens of commodification, decommodification and recommodification.
S. Sankaari and S. Frerichs, ‘From Resource to Burden: Rescaling Solidarity with Strangers in the Single Market’ (2016) 22 European
Law Journal, 806.
174 KRAMERconnection to labour, mobility and welfare, it highlights the relevance of the reconstruction of the homo economicus in
processes of subjectification in EU law.2.1 | The homo economicus of (neo)liberal government
The appearance of the homo economicus as a subject of government can be located in the eighteenth century with the
emergence of classical economic liberalism. In contrast to political liberalism, economic liberalism is not only about the
acceptance of freedom in an absolute sense, but rather about “manufacturing” or “producing” certain freedoms or
rights as a means for achieving governmental ends.6 While constitutions based on political liberalism speak of a “lib-
erty” of a transcendental right that constitutes the source of government, constructing the legal subject of the state,7
the homo juridicus, economic liberalism constructed a fundamentally economic subject, the homo economicus, by
conceiving of the market as a “natural” space. The “market” represented a site of verification and truth and therefore
worked as a principle for governmental reason and “self‐limitation”. Governmental self‐limitation (call it “laissez‐faire”)
was not only achieved through a prior commitment to individual rights, but was rather presented as a “method” for
achieving governmental objectives. As classical liberalism focused on mankind's tendency to “barter, truck, and
exchange”, the homo economicus of classical liberalism was based on an anthropology of man as an “exchanging crea-
ture”,8 who must be left alone to pursue his own interest, and whose interest is such that it converges spontaneously
with the interest of others.9 In a broad sense, one could argue that neoliberalism extended economic activity as a gen-
eral grid of intelligibility to other social domains by recasting social relations in terms of market conduct.10 However,
instead of focusing on the “natural”mechanisms of the market, it focused on competition as an artificial relation which
must be protected against the monopolistic tendencies of markets and intervention by the state. Equally, the homo
economicus transformed from an “exchanging creature” to a “competitive creature”, or rather a creature whose ten-
dency to compete must be fostered.112.2 | From exchange to entrepreneurship: Labour, mobility and social welfare
The transformation of the homo economicus within economic liberalism has had implications for the way the labour
process and the workers are conceptualised and mobility choices and social policies are perceived. Early political lib-
eralism, as presented by John Locke, theorised labour as the process of adding use‐value to natural resources that
were in themselves nearly worthless. It thereby served to legitimate private ownership of the person who labours
on unowned natural resources in the state of nature and therefore, arguably, justified unequal ownership in an econ-
omy characterised by scarcity of resources as it descends from people's exercise of self‐owned powers or rewards for
past labour.12 This very inequality, in its turn, justified wage‐labour, with the worker consenting to selling the property
generated by “the labour of his Body, and theWork of his Hands.”13 Adam Smith, as is well known, saw the division of6M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics; Lectures at Collège de France 1978–1979 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), at 65.
7Liberty in the American Declaration of Independence, for example, is presented as an “unalienable right” that cannot be surrendered
and a transcendental source that legitimates government. Similarly, in the French constitution, the subject is presented as having cer-
tain “imprescriptible rights”, which include liberty that consists of the freedom to do everything which injures no one else.
8J. Read, ‘A Genealogy of Homo‐Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity’ (2009) 6 Foucault Studies, 25, 27–28.
9A. Dilts, ‘From “Entrepreneur of the Self” to “Care of the Self”: Neo‐liberal Governmentality and Foucault's Ethics’ (2011) 12 Foucault
Studies, 130, 131. Also Foucault, above, n. 6, at 270.
10See, also, A. Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti‐Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 85.
11Read, above, n. 8, at 28.
12As Locke stated, “it being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by this Labour something annexed to it,
that excludes the common right of other Men.” Locke, Second Treatise, section 27. G. Cohen, Self‐ownership, Freedom and Equality
(Cambridge University Press, 1995).
13Locke, above, n. 12. Whereas for Marx this process formed the very “alienation” from one's labour, libertarian scholars have later
interpreted this ownership over one's body as “human capital stock”. According to them, self‐ownership for Locke was “freedom, social
KRAMER 175labour as the source of economic growth and raising living standards. While acknowledging the possibility of alien-
ation of workers and their possible unequal bargaining position to the capital owners, later famously analysed by
Marx, Smith assumed exchange as the general matrix for society: the “natural” mechanism of market forces would
adequately structure the level of the wages.14 In classical economics then, as well as in Marxist analysis,15 labour
was theorised as a “passive” factor of production and a static term of exchange; it was only relevant in terms of quan-
tity and price.16
The neoliberal critique of classical economics focused on this conception of labour as a “homogeneous input free
of any capital components” and sought to bring labour into the field of economic analysis. The “worker” in the neolib-
eral sense is no longer present in economic analysis as an object (or a commodity), but rather theorised as an active
economic subject possessing a “human capital”. “The distinctive mark of human capital”, as one of the early advocates
of the concept explained in 1971, “is that it is part of man. It is human because it is embodied in man, and capital
because it is a source of future satisfactions, or of future earnings, or of both.”17 In this conception, “capital” became
the generalised concept for everything that might be the source of future income and a worker's wage is perceived as
an income that is the “return” on this capital. Seen from the perspective of the worker then, labour comprises a capital,
which is the set of all those physical and psychological factors which make up the “ability” or “skill” to generate an
individualised “earnings stream”.18 In other words, in neoliberal economics, the conception of a worker's labour power
transformed from a passive abstraction into an active capital‐ability which earns him an income‐wage, “so that the
worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise for himself”.19
Among the elements making up this “human capital”, which can be formed in the course of an individual's life
through “investments”, the individual's ability to move around and migrate is an important component.20 The earliest
contribution to economics that linked the phenomenon of migration with human capital dates back to 1962, when
Sjaastad argued that the effectiveness of migration “as an equilibrator” can be improved by treating migration not
as an effect of forces into the appropriate direction (that is to say, a netmigration to areas with higher income or earn-
ings), but as “investments in the human agent” by employing the human capital concept.21 Human migration is hence
seen as incurring “costs”, both material and psychological, but since the function of these costs is to reap long‐run
gains, it is “an investment with expected positive returns to the individual”, while “it can also be welfare enhancing
for society when workers relocate to where their human capital is most productive”.22 With the emergence of the
concept of human capital, the mobility of a population was brought back into economic analysis “not as pure and sim-
ple effects of economic mechanisms which extend beyond individuals […] but as heavier in terms of individual enter-
prise.”23 In the process, the identity of the “migrant worker” transformed from a passive subject who responds to
economic mechanisms external to him/herself into an active economic subject who possesses a human capital and
whose decision to move is to be regarded as an individual choice in terms of investment.mobility and improved economic opportunities for all, but especially for the talented and industrious.” K. Vaughan, ‘John Locke and the
Labor Theory of Value’ (1978) 2 Journal of Libertarian Studies, 311, 323.
14V. George, Major Thinkers in Welfare: Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective (Polity, 2012), at 165.
15Read, above, n. 8, at 33, discusses the one exception, when in his Grundrisse, Marx states that “an increase of free time, i.e. time for
the full development of the individual, […] in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labor” and can be “regarded as the pro-
duction of fixed capital, this fixed capital being man himself.”
16Dilts, above, n. 9, at 134.
17T.W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital: The Role of Education and Research (The Free Press, 1971), at 148.
18Foucault, above, n. 6, at 224.
19Ibid., at 225.
20Ibid., at 230.
21L. Sjaastad, ‘The Costs and Returns of Human Migration’ (1962) 70 Journal of Political Economy, 80, 87. Emphasis added.
22J. Poot, B. Waldorf and L. van Wissen, ‘Migration in a Globalised World: A New Paradigm’, in J. Poot, B. Waldorf and L. van Wissen
(eds.), Migration and Human Capital (Edward Elgar, 2008), at 3.
23Foucault, above, n. 6, at 230.
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“widely recognised” that human capital investments produce positive rates of return not only to individual
beneficiaries but to society as a whole, scholars have called for a major shift in conventional social policy thinking
towards interventions that “enhance capabilities, invest in people, facilitate economic involvement and contribute
positively to economic development.”24 Citizens are invited to perceive of themselves as running their own
enterprises to face “life's risks” while the state guides and supports them by investing in the formation, improvement
and preservation of their capital‐ability and providing an effective infrastructure to employ their productive potential.
What can be called the “social investment paradigm” therefore forms both a method of analysis, a grid of intelligence
for the critical assessment of the effectiveness of social policies, and a type of programming. Although it adopts a “do
not laissez‐faire” attitude towards the actions of the state, the market simultaneously functions as a sort of “permanent
economic tribunal confronting government”.25 Within this paradigm, social rights, rather than guarantees and
achievements of social conflict, are reshaped to facilitate market performance and combating social exclusion is no
longer only achieved by decommodification but by bringing marginalised individuals back in to the market.26 In
sum, social investment resonates the philosophy of neoliberal “market citizenship”: it becomes the state's role to “help
citizens to help themselves” and the citizens' largest obligation, ultimately, is to be (or become) self‐reliant.272.3 | Subjectification through law
By effacing the difference between labour and capital, it could be argued that the theory of human capital
allowed capitalism to penetrate even more deeply into human existence.28 What contemporary Marxist philoso-
phers call the latest “ideological triumph” of capitalism,29 every worker becomes his/her own capitalist, the “entre-
preneur of the self” who is fully responsible for his/her choices, conceptualised as investments in education,
migration, healthcare, etc., with the logical consequence that responsibility is purely individual: “those who fail
to succeed have no one to blame but themselves”.30 As a result, the perceptions of individual failure constructed
by neoliberal discourse, despite them often being inevitable for structural reasons, serve as a further legitimation
for social and material inequality and obscuring class antagonisms.31 By exchanging the terms of opposition
between “worker” and “capital”, neoliberalism constructs the “Arbeitskraftunternehmer”32 and overcomes in termi-
nology their longstanding opposition.33 Crucially then, the homo economicus of neoliberalism is not so much a
product of a transformation of the economic base of forces and relations of production, but of a process of
“subjectification”.3424J. Midgley and J. Tang, ‘Social Policy, Economic Growth and Developmental Welfare’ (2001) 10 International Journal of Social Welfare,
244, 248 and 251.
25Foucault, above, n. 6, at 247.
26M. Dani, ‘The Subjectification of the Citizen in European Public Law’, in Azoulai et al., above, n. 3, 55, at 74–75. See also Sankari and
Frerichs, above, n. 5, at 812.
27N. Deckhard and A. Heslin, ‘After Postnational Citizenship: Constructing the Boundaries of Inclusion in Neoliberal Contexts’ (2016)
10 Sociology Compass, 294, 298.
28M. Foucault, ‘Truth and Judicial Forms’, in M. Foucault, Power; Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, Vol. 3, edited by J. Faubion
(Penguin Books, 1994) 1, at 86.
29S. Žižek, Event: De Filosofie van de Gebeurtenis (Uitgeverij Boom, 2015), at 167.
30J. Lawrence, Between Rights and Market: Governmentality in EU External Trade and Environment Policy, PhD dissertation, 2015, at 175.
31See H. Pongratz and G. Voß, ‘From Employee to “Entreployee”—Towards a “Self‐entrepreneurial”Work Force?’ (2003) 8(3) Concepts
& Transformation, 239.
32Ibid.
33Read, above, n. 8, at 31.
34Ibid., at 32.
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for mobility.35 Understood in a comprehensive sense, government through subjectification designates the way in
which the conduct of others is directed by tying them to their own identity by a conscience or self‐knowledge.36 This
requires conceiving of law as part of a “policy” that concerns itself with “order at the level of populations and their
individual components and informed by the regularities and interests depicted by human sciences.”37 As Foucault
remarked, “it is not a matter of imposing a law on men, but of […] employing laws as tactics.”38 Recent EU legislation,
for example, obliges Member States to inform their citizens of these rights and obligations as Union citizens in order to
let citizens “realise their intentions to become mobile workers”.39 Law in this sense, as Geertz argues, is not simply a
codification of explicit norms or a mechanism for social control, but also a “species of social imagination” that lets
people work out for themselves how they are going to live “lives they can practicably lead”.403 | THE HOMO ECONOMICUS OF EARLY INTEGRATION: PARTNER OF
LAISSEZ‐FAIRE
This historical section describes the development of the “worker” as the subject of legal norms from the establishment
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 to the initiation of the “final stage” of the establishment of
freedom of movement for workers in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1968. In essence, it is argued that
during this development the “worker” as a subject of government was transformed from a passive factor of production
in the European market to an active agent of choice.
3.1 | The European Coal and Steel Community
During the negotiations following the well‐known Schuman Plan, the issue of labour migration was broached by the
Italian delegation. Although political support for the European idea and the acquisition of cheaper raw materials also
featured, the promise of free movement for workers was the primary incentive and reason for Italian participation in
the ECSC,41 as it sought to “permit the export of its surplus [labour]”.42 In the absence of opposition from other
Member States, the Italian delegation was successful in its efforts to enshrine mobility rights in theTreaty establishing
the ECSC. In addition to the obligation to remove nationality restrictions for the employment of workers in the coal and
steel industries, Article 69 required Member States to establish Community‐wide arrangements for such qualified
workers to bring “offers of employment into touch with applications for employment” and adjust their immigration
rules for other workers in case that “growth of coal and steel production be hampered by a shortage of suitable labour”.43
Clearly, Article 69 hardly contained self‐executing provisions, requiring intergovernmental negotiations to
implement the necessary measures, a process which was guided and facilitated by the High Authority. After prolonged35See W. Walters and J. Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration (Routledge, 2005), at 17.
36M. Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Foucault, above, n. 28, at 331 and 341.
37B. Golder and P. Fitzpatrick, Foucault's Law (Routledge, 2009), at 33–34. Everson goes a long way in connecting European citizenship
with a form of “bio‐power” inherent in economic liberalism in the context of the controversial Viking and Laval cases, specifically so
when she describes the rebirth of the European economic citizen as a homo economicus whose life chances are to be pursued and
determined within “the totalizing rationality of law as an economic technology”. M. Everson, ‘A Citizenship in Movement’ (2014) 15
German Law Journal, 965.
38M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population; Lectures at Collège de France 1977–1978 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), at 137.
39Directive 2014/54.
40C. Geertz, ‘Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective’, in C. Geertz (ed.), Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Inter-
pretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 1983), at 232–234. See also C. Fuller, ‘Legal Anthropology, Legal Pluralism and Legal Thought’
(1994) LSE Research Online, 14.
41W. Maas, ‘The Genesis of European Rights’ (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies, 1009, 1011.
42H. Mason, The European Coal and Steel Community: Experiment in Supranationalism (Martinus Nijhof, 1955), at 5.
43Article 69 ECSC Treaty.
178 KRAMERnegotiations, an agreement on the principle of free movement was concluded at the end of 1954 and an
administrative arrangement implementing the agreement in July 1955.44 Holders of a “Community labour card”,
available to workers who had a particular skill in coal or steel mining and had two years of experience, were exempted
from all visa requirements and permitted to travel freely within the Community in response to an offer of work. Since
this job offer had to be communicated to the worker through the labour exchanges or sent to him/her directly, in writ-
ing, by an employer, it follows that the card could not be used to seek work.45 With regard to these skilled workers,
discrimination in wages and working conditions based on nationality was eliminated and social security systems were
to be arranged so that the national regulation would not hamper their movement. However, since this agreement
would only come into force in September 1957 and only applied to skilled workers, who represented only one sixth
of the respective labour force, the practical effect was limited.46
The High Authority, however, regarded the agreement reached between the Member States as a first step
towards the gradual formation of a common labour market, which would create the conditions for stable employment
and achieve progress in the living and working conditions “everywhere at the same rate”.47 It consequently argued for
a multilateral agreement on social security and the perfection of the system whereby those offering and those seeking
employment are brought into touch.48 Also the Member State actors seemed to be supporting the ECSC's striving for
“efficiency and distribution of labour” in order to achieve the goal of a “sound economy based on a rational
distribution of labour in a free market”.49 In one of its meetings, the ECSC's Common Assembly even proposed to
insert a new article into theTreaty which would give the High Authority competences to propose measures to address
the disproportionalities between the supply of and demand for labour.50
Looking at subsequent practice, it is first interesting to look at the difference in how the limits of Article 69(1) on
the free movement of workers on the grounds of “health and public policy” were interpreted. It appears that whereas
nowadays limitations on health and public policy are used by the receiving Member State to restrict the movement of
individual Union citizens, in the ECSC these limitations were used by the sending state to suspend the total supply of
labour in response to concerns about health and safety measures in the coal and steel mining in another Member
State, effectively using the threat of a labour shortage as a means to improve safety standards in another country.51
The Italian government in particular suspended emigration to Belgium several times in this context, whereby the High
Authority functioned as a mediator, culminating in a total stop in August 1956 in response to a major mining
disaster.52 Secondly, applying to both skilled and unskilled workers, Article 69(3) essentially contained the idea that
if production in a Member State required a larger labour force, immigration laws would be changed to admit both
types of workers.53 In practice, this provision was interpreted as meaning that only when a possible expansion of44The High Authority, Report on the Situation of the Community; Laid Before the Extraordinary Session of the Common Assembly, Luxem-
bourg, November 1955, III, at 3.
45The High Authority, Report on the Situation of the Community; Laid Before the Extraordinary Session of the Common Assembly, Luxem-
bourg, November 1954, at 139–141.
46See, in this regard, A. Bouscaren, European Economic Community Migrations (Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), at 107–109, who notes that the
skilled workers were exactly “those most in demand in their home countries and were the highest paid because of their skills” and
hence had “the lowest rate of mobility in practice”.
47High Authority, above, n. 45, at 142.
48Ibid.
49Joined Meeting of the Members of The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the members ofthe Common Assem-
bly of the European Community of Coal and Steel, Official Report of the Debate, Strasbourg, 22 June 1953, at 71.
50Maas, above, n. 41, at 1018.
51W. Diebold, The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950–1959 (Oxford University Press, 1959), at 444.
52The Marcinelle disaster took place in August 1956, killing 269 miners, many of whom were Italians. As a response, the Italian gov-
ernment stopped all emigration to Community coal mines. See ibid.
53Ibid., at 436.
KRAMER 179production in the coal and steel industries could be impeded by a shortage of unskilled labour, would immigration
restrictions on such workers be modified in order to ease the labour situation.543.2 | The Treaty of Rome
Negotiations on a more general common European market were preluded by a meeting of foreign ministers in May
1955. This “resolution of Messina” directed the inter‐governmental committee to work towards the “gradual
establishment of the free circulation of manpower”.55 Despite Italy's pressure, no right to look for jobs was contem-
plated and the guiding principle remained the primacy of demand‐induced migration mediated through national
employment services.56 In the Spaak report, unemployment was referred to as “a resource” for European growth.
More fundamentally, the Spaak report spoke about “freeing up” the factors of production, that is to say, both capital
and labour. A more efficient allocation of these factors would contribute to increased standards of living. The free
movement of labour was proposed as a “technique” to direct more workers to regions and sectors where
productivity was highest in order to increase general economic production, while taking account of the possible
detrimental effects on wage levels due to increased labour supply from different Member States.57 As argued by
Verschueren, the Spaak report resembled the initiatives regarding the international movement of workers during
the 1950s (i.e. the ECSC, the OECD and the Council of Europe), which focused on resolving the “respective shortages
and surpluses on the labour markets”.58
Since the theoretical justifications of the Spaak report merely served as the basis for the negotiations on the
Treaty of Rome, it can be questioned when considering the final Treaty provision whether the Member States had
really intended and committed themselves to putting the theoretical notion of free labour mobility fully into practical
reality.59 It rather seems that the Member States opted for a demand‐induced free movement scheme which would
gradually soak up the Italian “labour surplus”.60 Indeed, when looking at the wording of theTreaty, it appears unlikely
the Member States intended a genuine labour mobility, as this would have required the right for individuals to look for
work in other Member States. Such a right was discussed during the negotiations, but rejected, instead making the
right to movement conditional upon an offer of employment actually made.61 With the exception of those employed
in public service, freedom of movement for all workers would entail “the right to accept offers of employment actually
made; to move freely within the territory of the member States for this purpose; to stay in a member State for the
purpose of employment … [and] to remain in the territory of a member State after having been employed in that
State.”62 Provided by Article 49 of the Treaty, the Council was given the competence, upon proposal by the
Commission, to adopt in “progressive stages” measures required to bring about the free movement of workers and
set up “appropriate machinery to bring offers of employment into touch with applications for employment and to
facilitate the achievement of a balance between supply and demand in the employment market”.54Bouscaren, above, n. 46, at 107. If this situation were to occur, special effort was to be directed towards obtaining coal and steel
labour from other Member States. This happened in Germany in the autumn of 1955, when the German government sought to attract
Italian labour, as the “reserves of labour among the émigrés and refugees” were largely used up and the “labour force” was affected by
the low level of wartime births. For this, see Diebold, above, n. 51, at 447 fn.
55F. Romero, ‘Migration as an Issue in European Interdependence and Integration: The Case of Italy’, in A. Milward, F. Lynch and R.
Ranieri, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945–1992 (Routledge, 1993), 33, at 52.
56Ibid.
57H. Verschueren, Internationale Arbeidsmigratie: de Toegang tot de Arbeidsmarkt voor Vreemdelingen naar Belgisch, Internationaal en
Europees Gemeenschapsrecht (Die Keure, PhD dissertation, 1990), at 236–237.
58Ibid., at 237.
59A.P. Van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community: Cross‐Border Access to Public Benefits (PhD dissertation,
2001), at 29–32. Cf., e.g., Verschueren, above, n. 57, at 236–240.
60Van der Mei, above, n. 59, at 32.
61Ibid., at 31.
62Article 48 EEC.
180 KRAMERIn the context of a reduced migration flow from Italy and organised immigration from third countries through
guest worker schemes during the early 1960s, questions arose around the more or less “forced” promotion of labour
migration in order to solve regional economic disparities.63 In this context, the free movement rights were no longer
only conceived of in terms of the efficient exchange of the production factor labour, but also in terms of individual
freedom.64 Hence, Regulation No. 38.64, preluding the second phase of the transitional period, for the first time
affirmed the right of all workers to employment of their choice, while still leaving room for Member States to suspend
the freedom of workers in the event of serious imbalances caused by labour flows.65 Stage two can be identified as a
shift in accent towards the implementation of the factual exercise of a new, more general right to movement in the
form of a clear formulation of the right of access to the labour market, although this right was still confined to offers
of employment which were mediated through national labour exchanges.66
Finally, Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 68/360were adopted in 1968, which would provide for nearly 40 years
the main source of rules on equal access to work and conditions of employment in secondary Community law.
Crucially, the freedom of movement was presented as “a fundamental right of workers and their families”, which could
be used by the worker as a means to improve his/her living and working conditions and promote his/her social
advancement, while also “helping to satisfy the requirements of the economies of the Member States”. Similarly
important, the right of all workers in the Member States to pursue the activity of their choice within the Community
was affirmed.67 The new rules demanded that every national of a Member State had the right to accept employment
and work in another Member State under the same conditions and the same priority as the local workers.68 In addi-
tion, a declaration attached to the minutes of the meeting adopting the Directive granted Community nationals a
minimum residence period of three months for the purpose of seeking work.69 The principle of priority of the national
labour market was reduced to the unlikely possibility of a serious disturbance of the labour market.703.3 | Governing mobility through purposive freedoms
Early European integration constructed a “market citizen”, which encompassed the limited role the individual
European was “expected to play” as homo economicus in the legal and practical realisation of a common market.71
But taking note of the original intentions, the wording of the Treaty and subsequent agreement and practice, one
can distil a “worker” who is imagined as a partner of laissez‐faire, a production factor which responds to the economic
mechanisms of demand and supply in the European coal and steel market. The mobility rights accorded to the
European coal and steel workers are directed towards the “freeing up” of their ability to respond to the mechanisms
of expansion and contraction of economic production which extend beyond them as individuals. In a similar vein, the
negotiations and the wording of the original Treaty of Rome show the original Member States' intentions to establish
a free movement scheme which was demand‐induced, would not disturb the national labour markets and would63Ibid., at 248.
64Probably the most striking illustration of this shift are the rather mixed considerations of the Social and Economic Committee in its
advice to the second regulation: “Considering that the free movement of workers represents an individual right, which corresponds
with the principle of human dignity and freedom; considering that an equilibrium should be established between the constantly chang-
ing demand for and supply of labour, with the view of ensuring an optimal utilisation of the factor ‘labour’; considering that the free
movement is a means to bring about an equilibrium in the common market” [translation from Dutch]. Advies Europees Sociaal Comité
van 31 januari 1963, PB, 17 April 1964, at 1014.
65Preamble and Art. 2, Reg. 38/64.
66Arts 1 and 8, Reg. 38/64.
67Consideration 3, Reg. 1612/68.
68Art. 1, Reg. 1612/68.
69Case C‐292/89, Antonissen, ECLI:EU:C:1991:80, para. 17.
70Art. 20, Reg. 1612/68.
71Everson, above, n. 2, at 73 and 85.
KRAMER 181gradually soak up the Italian labour surplus. Free movement rights were theoretically justified and functioned as tools
for solving the need for an efficient allocation of labour as a factor of production in the European common market.72
In this early knowledge space of Europe, as a governable entity of economic mechanisms, legal subjects of Euro-
pean integration are primarily identified as contributors to these economic processes and “freedom” is adopted as its
instrument.73 The “worker” enjoys a right to “move freely within the territory of Member States”, but instead of being
“inalienable” or “imprescriptible”, this freedom is rather conditional upon the acceptance of “offers of employment
actually made”.74 The rights to be enjoyed by the worker, e.g. the right not to be discriminated against (current Article
45(2) TFEU), or the competences to be enjoyed by the Union, e.g. social policy (current Articles 151–161 TFEU), social
security (Article 48 TFEU) and the establishment of a “European Social Fund” (Article 162 TFEU), are directed towards
the achievement of this specific freedom, essentially constructing subjects that move in a purposeful direction.75 In a
similar vein, the Court's traditional activism with respect to workers' social rights sought to remove all, actual and
potential, obstacles hindering their mobility, attributing them with “both penetrating foresight and inordinate sensitiv-
ity” towards such obstacles.76 Extending the liberal mode of political rationality to the regional level, we could there-
fore consider the EEC Treaty as forming an economic constitution of Europe.77
During a period of relative full employment in the 1960s, the government of mobile workers was disconnected
from economic forces external to themselves and shifted to targeting the choice‐making individual possessing the fun-
damental right to move freely while also satisfying the needs of the economies of the Member States. Here, we do not
only see “an incipient form—still embryonic and imperfect—of European citizenship”,78 but also, from a strategic point
of view, an incipient form—equally embryonic and imperfect—of the self‐enterprising worker who by “relocating his/
her human capital” promotes both his/her own social and financial advancement and general welfare for society.4 | TOWARDS THE “NEW” HOMO ECONOMICUS OF EU FREE MOVEMENT
LAW
Already widening the personal scope of free movement related to workers during the 1970s and 1980s, progressive
case law of the Court of Justice would explore uncharted territory since the 1990s. This new activity was spurred
firstly by the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, which sought to “complete the internal market”, preluding
the adoption of three directives on economically inactive EU nationals,79 and secondly by the introduction of Union
citizenship with the Treaty of Maastricht. By locating its “genus” in human rights80 and confirming a degree of72As Dani notes, early supranational law conceives of individuals “as factors of production” and looks at them “essentially in instru-
mental terms”, above, n. 26, at 61. See, also, A. Menéndez, ‘European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European
Law Become More Humane but Less Social?’, in M. Poiares and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU
Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishers, 2010), at 363.
73Walters and Haahr, above, n. 35, at 44–46.
74Article 45(3) TFEU, former Article 48(3) EEC.
75One could say that through non‐discriminatory access to social benefits and their portability, the “decommodification” of workers
achieved at the national level gained a European dimension, thereby removing potential obstacles to free movement. Sankari and
Frerichs, above, n. 5, at 810.
76M. Dougan, ‘The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy of the Case Law on the Free Movement of Union Citizens’, in H.
Adams, H. deWaele, J. Meeusen and G. Straetmans (eds.), Judging Europe's Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court
of Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013), at 137.
77For an account of an ordoliberal interpretation of the EEC Treaty as a law‐based order committed to guaranteeing economic free-
doms and protecting competition by supranational institutions, see C. Joerges, ‘What is Left of European Economic Constitution?’
(2004) 13 EUI Working Paper, Law, at 13–16.
78Speech by L. Levi‐Sandri, Vice‐president of the European Commission, in 1968, published in EC‐Bulletin 11/1968, at 5, as cited by
Wollenschläger, above, n. 2, at 32.
79Directives 90/364, 90/363 and 93/96.
80Case C‐85/96, Martínez Sala, ECLI:EU:C:1998:217.
182 KRAMERtransnational “solidarity”,81 the Court of Justice subsequently expanded the dramatis personae of the European inte-
gration stage to include persons moving across frontiers for non‐economic reasons, reflecting a process of
“humanising” the “market citizen”.82 Yet, the Member States' political decision to subject the right to move and reside
freely to “the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by measures adopted to give them effect”,
essentially to the exclusion of those who form an “unreasonable burden” on public finances, opened up a process that
transformed the European market citizen. The rational underpinnings of the new constitutional subject of EU free
movement law, it is argued, conform much more closely to those of the anthropology of the homo economicus of neo-
liberal government.4.1 | The real link: Assessing economic potential of the work seeker
The meaning of “work” in the context of lawful residence and equal treatment had been interpreted expansively by
the Court in the course of the 1980s, requiring the pursuit of those activities that are “effective and genuine”, to
the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely “marginal and ancillary”.83 As is clear from
the previous section, the right to move freely within the territory of the Community in order to seek employment was
initially not envisioned in the EEC, as this right was conditioned upon the reception of an actual offer of employment.
Community nationals moving in search of employment therefore did not qualify for equal treatment with regard to
social and tax advantages.84 In Antonissen, however, the Court argued that a strict interpretation of this right would
jeopardise the actual chances of a work seeker in another Member State and accordingly render the freedom of move-
ment, which formed “one of the foundations of the Community”, ineffective.85 Hereby affirming the right to move
freely and stay in another Member State for the purpose of seeking work, the Court ruled that it was not contrary
to EU law to require a work seeker to leave after a reasonable period, unless (s)he provides evidence that (s)he con-
tinues to seek work and has “genuine chances of being engaged”.86
The next question concerned the implications of this new criterion for the social rights of work seekers in their
host Member State. Confirming earlier case law that “a person who is genuinely seeking work must also be considered
a worker”, the Court stated in its Collins case that the rights of work seekers under current Article 45 TFEU should be
interpreted in the light of the more general right to equal treatment of citizens.87 Although the Court repeated its
statement in Lebon that the right to equal treatment with regard to social and tax advantages only applied to workers,
it argued that the establishment of citizenship of the Union made it no longer possible to exclude from the scope of
Article 45(2) “a benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a
Member State”.88 Relying on its citizenship case law, in particular the case of D'Hoop, the Court continued that it
was legitimate for the national legislator to ensure a “genuine link” between the applicant and the “geographic
employment market in question”, which can be determined, in particular, by establishing that the person
concerned has, for a reasonable period, in fact genuinely sought work in the Member State in question.89 In its81Case C‐184/99, Grzelczyk, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458.
82See, especially, Menéndez, above, n. 72.
83Case C‐53/81, Levin, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105, para. 17.
84Case C‐316/85, Lebon, ECLI:EU:C:1987:302, para. 26.
85Antonissen, paras 11–12.
86Antonissen, para. 22. The potentially “harsh” consequences of this decision became apparent in the case of Tsiotras, in which it was
“objectively impossible” for the person concerned, due to occupational incapacity, to find employment. Case C‐171/91, Tsiotras, ECLI:
EU:C:1993:215, para. 14. See also in this regard the Opinion of Advocate‐General Darmon in Case C‐171/91, paras 32, 33 and 36.
87Case C‐138/02, Collins, ECLI:EU:C:2004:172, paras 56–57.
88Ibid., para. 63. Emphasis added.
89Ibid., paras 67 and 70. Although the Court confirmed that conditions may be attached in order to guarantee a genuine link with the
employmentmarket, these conditions should not go beyondwhat is necessary to attain this objective. For the application of this proportion-
ality test, see Case C‐258/04, Ioannidis, ECLI:EU:C:2005:559, paras 31 and 32, and Case C‐367/11, Prete, ECLI:EU:C:2012:668, para. 52.
KRAMER 183Vatsouras case, the Court made clear that work seekers are only entitled to benefits which facilitate access to
employment and not to “social assistance” in the sense of Article 24(2), a distinction that can be made on the
basis of their constituent elements and in particular its purposes and the conditions subject to which it is
granted.90
Citizenship allowed the Court to apply equal treatment as regards financial assistance that is intended to facilitate
access to employment for as long as there is a link with the geographic employment market, in which evidence of an
active search for employment plays an important part.91 If we understand the “real link” concept as providing Union
law with a general tool to objectively legitimate indirectly discriminatory restrictions to welfare access, the “genuine
link with the employment market” rationalises entitlement to foreign work seekers on the basis of the individual's
future participation in the economic life of the host society.92 In this sense, case law and its later implementation
of Directive 2004/38 (“Citizens Directive”)93 allow the work seeker to enjoy equal treatment as long as (s)he is actively
and genuinely seeking employment (or in economic terms: “as long as (s)he is making investments in him/herself”),
thereby essentially requiring the development of a specifically EU body of administrative law directed at an “overall
assessment” of an applicant's individual economic potential to enter or return to a specific geographic employment
market. This is illustrated in later cases, where the Court specified that national authorities have to assess whether
a job‐seeking Union citizen applying for a benefit facilitating access to the labour market in another Member State
is “in a position to establish a real link with the employment market of that State”.94 Clearly, equal treatment of the
work seeker is a manifestation of Union social citizenship based upon the potential assimilation of Union citizens into
the welfare system of the host society on the basis of future economic contribution.954.2 | (Un)reasonable burdens: Solidarity based on prior and prospective “economic
capability”
The limitations and conditions to the movement and residence of economically inactive Union citizens found their ori-
gin in the residence directives, requiring the possession of sufficient resources and full medical coverage in order to
avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. Inspired by the establishment
of Union citizenship, the Court subjected the application of these conditions in the case of actual recourse to social
assistance to the principle of proportionality and an assessment of the personal circumstances of the individual
applicant. In its famous 2001 Grzelczyk judgment, the ECJ ruled that although EU law does not prevent Member States
from withdrawing or not renewing a residence permit, such measures may in no case “become the automatic conse-
quence of […] having recourse to the host Member State's social assistance system”.96 The Court continued by stating
that beneficiaries of the right of residence must not become an unreasonable burden on the public finances of the host
Member State, but also that there is a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State
and nationals of other Member States, particularly if the difficulties are “temporary”.97 Whereas the Court appears
to find disproportionate a removal measure with respect to the circumstances of a final‐year student's financial90Case C‐22/08 and C‐23/08, Vatsouras, ECLI:EU:C:2009:344, para. 41.
91Collins, para. 70.
92M. Dougan, ‘The Court Helps Those who Help Themselves … The Legal Status of Migrant Work‐Seekers Under Community Law in
the Light of the Collins Judgment’ (2005) 7 European Journal of Social Security, 16.
93Art. 14(4)(b), Directive 2004/38.
94Ioannidis, para. 33. Emphasis added.
95As Dougan notes, case law on the free movement rights demonstrates that the Court helps those categories of citizens “who are
trying to better themselves in some orthodox economic way”, above, n. 92, at 31.
96Grzelczyk, para. 43.
97Ibid., para 44.
184 KRAMERhardship,98 it indicates quite openly that the circumstances of a Union citizen who has never worked in his host
Member State, is accommodated and maintained by the Salvation Army and is taking part in a socio‐occupational
reintegration programme would allow for a removal measure.99
The considerations in these early citizenship cases triggered the codification of both the criterion of an “unrea-
sonable burden” in the Citizens Directive, even listing the personal factors to be taken into account when enforcing
a removal measure in its preamble.100 When assessing the “reasonableness” of the burden, authorities of the host
Member State are supposed to examine “whether it is a case of temporary difficulties and take into account the dura-
tion of residence, the personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted”.101 It is on the basis of the word “unrea-
sonable”—operating as a measure of willingness of the Member States to afford “real succour to the indigent Union
citizen”102—that national authorities are required to embark on a case‐by‐case assessment in light of the moral econ-
omy of social entitlement gradually developing in the Court's case law.103 The case‐by‐case assessment, centring the
individual at the heart of the legal analysis, culminated in the controversial Brey case, in which the Court stated that
“an overall assessment” is to be carried out by the competent national authorities “of the specific burden which
granting that benefit would place on the national social assistance system as a whole, by reference to the personal cir-
cumstances characterising the individual situation of the person concerned”.104
On the basis of the “unreasonable burden” test, the Court also affirmed that it is legitimate for a Member State to
grant maintenance aid for studies only to those citizens, students in case, “who have demonstrated a certain degree of
integration into the society of that State”.105 Interestingly, a genuine link with “society” allows for a more extensive
assessment of relevant factors. Whereas in the cases of Bidar and Förster, integration into society was demonstrated
through “mere presence” for a “certain time”, in more recent cases on the export of study finance, the Court has also
incorporated elements such as nationality, prior education, family ties, employment, language skills or the existence of
“other social and economic factors”.106 In the words of Barbou des Places, assessments of rights to entitlement
become “short stories” about personal characteristics, conduct and motives within a patchwork of personhoods.107
Students receive help in their upward social mobility by virtue of their being part of certain polity in more intangible
socio‐cultural terms.108 At the same time, however, the Court implicitly endorsed the so‐called “homecoming crite-
rion” as a condition for access to student benefits.109 Instead of only prior social ties, the Court suggests that also pro-
spective economic ties justify access to student benefits, leading de Witte to conclude that “Member States must be
able to extract a return upon their investment in the young student”.11098After all, the student is likely to contribute to the economy and the welfare system of the host Member State. This argument of stu-
dents as “future economic contributors” is distilled by some scholars in earlier cases, like Lawrie‐Brun and Raulin, but is even more valid
for Grzelczyk. See, e.g., S. O'Leary, ‘Developing an Ever Closer Union between the Peoples of Europe? A Reappraisal of the Case Law of
the Court of Justice on the Free Movement of Persons and EU Citizenship’ (2008) 27 Yearbook of European Law, 167, 176 fn 39.
99Trojani.
100Rec. 16 and Art. 7, Directive 2004/38.
101Rec. 16 Directive 2004/38.
102Everson, ‘European Citizenship’, above, n. 2.
103On the basis of this case law, the Commission developed a “points‐based scheme”with a range of criteria to be assessed by national
authorities, including the “duration” (is it “likely that the EU citizen will get out of the safety net soon?”), the “personal situation” (relat-
ing to the level of integration into the host society) and the “total amount granted” (relating to the applicant's “history of relying heavily
on social assistance” and “contribution to the financing of social assistance in the host Member State”). European Commission,
COM(2009) 313 final, at 8–9.
104Case C140−/2012, Brey, ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, para. 64. Emphasis added.
105Case C‐209/03, Bidar, ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, para. 57. Case C‐158/07, Förster ECLI:EU:C:1990:313, para. 49.
106Cases C‐523/11 and C‐585/11, Prinz and Seeberger, ECLI:EU:C:2013:524, para 38.
107S. Barbou des Places, ‘The Integrated Person in EU Law’, in Azoulai et al., above, n. 3, at 191–192.
108F. de Witte, Justice in the EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity (Oxford University Press, 2015), at 163.
109Cases C‐542/09, Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2012:346, para. 77, and Case C‐20/12, Giersch, ECLI:EU:C:2013:411, paras 64–68.
110De Witte, above, n. 108, at 166.
KRAMER 185From the perspective of the “short story” that entitles the archetype of the integrated person to EU rights, the
Dano case, rather than a radical disruption in the Court's case law with respect to social assistance benefits, merely
constructs the antithesis of Grzelczyk. Instead of an active, integrated individual on a pathway to self‐sufficiency,
the protagonist in Dano is marked as the prototypical “welfare tourist” by emphasising her lack of motivation to inte-
grate and escape from her marginal situation within German society.111 Blurring the facts of the case with an assess-
ment of the compatibility of Germany's legal provision, the Court concluded that in order to prevent migrant Union
citizens from becoming an unreasonable burden, Member States may reject social benefits to economically inactive
Union citizens who exercise their rights to free movement “solely in order to obtain another Member State's social
assistance benefits although they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right of residence”.112 In contrast to
Trojani, in which the Union citizen enjoyed equal treatment as long as no explicit removal measure was taken, the
Court now merged the equal treatment and lawful residence test, indicating that those individuals who lack sufficient
resources can neither claim equal treatment with respect to social assistance.113 Although the compatibility of a lawful
residence test preceding equal treatment rights has been confirmed in Commission v. UK,114 the position of the individ-
ual assessment in the lawful residence test has remained ambiguous to date.115
The acquisition of permanent residence, a status introduced by the Citizens Directive, forms the high end of prov-
ing belonging and worthy socio‐economic behaviour. The Court assumes that the general scheme and the spirit of
permanent residence demonstrates an integration‐based reasoning, revolving around the link between a person
and the host Member State.116 “Mere presence” for a certain period of time is apparently not enough.117 Instead,
the Citizens Directive is mostly imbued with an “integration through work” philosophy, while having the “consumerist
route” of economic “self‐sufficiency” available for the economically inactive.118 In both cases, the five‐year period is
not only regarded as a qualitative factor of integration, meaning the connection of the individual with the fabric of a
national society,119 but rather, and crucially so, as a proof of economic contribution. In this way, mobile Union citizens
can prove themselves to be self‐sufficient individuals and “pay their way” into permanent residence as a form of
“earned social citizenship” in another Member State.120111Case C‐333/13, Dano, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, paras 35–39. Ms Dano's story is one of a low level of education, limited knowledge of
the German language, a lack of professional training and experience and, despite her ability to work, apparent reluctance to find a job.
112Ibid., para. 78.
113It has to be remarked that before applying for benefits, Ms Dano had already resided some years in Germany, her son was born
there and her sister had provided for them materially. Ibid., para. 37.
114Case C‐308/14, Commission v. UK, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436.
115In Dano, the Court remarks that “the financial situation of each person should be examined specifically”, Dano, para. 80. In
Alimanovic and García‐Nieto, the Court objectifies the individual assessment by relying on the “gradual system” as regards the retention
of the status of worker which seeks to safeguard the right of residence and access to social assistance. Case C‐67/14, Alimanovic,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, para. 60, Case C‐299/14, García‐Nieto, ECLI:EU:C:2016:114, paras 46–48. In Commission v. UK, the Court con-
fines its analysis to the “systematic nature” of the verification process, while abstaining from the apparent limited individual assess-
ment conducted by the UK authorities. See Commission v. UK, paras 53, 83 and 84.
116The Court, while taking account of the travaux préparatoires, came to this conclusion in its Lassal judgment. Case C‐162/09, Lassal,
ECLI:EU:C:2010:592, paras 55–56. In Dias, the Court considered that this integration objective is based “not only on territorial and
time factors but also on qualitative elements, relating to the level of integration in the host Member State”. Case C‐325/09, Dias,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:498, para. 64.
117That the qualification of the level of integration can stretch even further than the circumstances mentioned in Article 16(4) was
made clear by the Court in its Onuekwere judgment, where periods of imprisonment were not taken into account for the residence
period as this type of residence would show such “non‐compliance by the person concerned with the values expressed by the society”
that the acquisition of permanent residence was considered contrary to the aim pursued by the Directive, i.e. integration. Case C‐378/
12, Onuekwere, ECLI:EU:C:2014:13, paras 24–25.
118For a treatment of certain aspects related to “EU time” as work‐time in the context of the Citizens Directive, see S. Mantu, ‘Con-
cepts of Time and EU Citizenship’ (2013) 15 European Journal of Migration and Law, 447.
119Barbou des Places, above, n. 107, at 187.
120On the idea of “earned social citizenship”, see D. Kramer, ‘Earning Social Citizenship in the European Union: Free Movement and
Access to Social Assistance Benefits Reconstructed’ (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 270.
186 KRAMER4.3 | Constituting the “Arbeitskraftunternehmer”: The “new” homo economicus of the
European Union
The case law intersecting at mobility and welfare discussed above reveals the emergence of the new governmental
subject of free movement, a subject mostly resonating with a neoliberal anthropology of man: it seeks to govern
through the individual's income machinery, (self‐)investments in the form of life choices and potential returns to both
him/herself and “society”. The “new” homo economicus of free movement law hence serves as a rational grid and frame
for government of the European mover by justifying both the responsibility on behalf of the Union citizen to be active,
self‐sufficient and integrated and on behalf of the host Member State to facilitate, within rational limits, the realisation
of one's “potential”.121 That transnational social rights are made dependent on past conduct and economic contribu-
tion and future economic potential of the individual Union citizen can be summed up, as has been done by Advocate
General Wahl in his opinion on the Brey case, as an assessment of Union citizens' “economic capability”.122 This sug-
gests a shift from the anthropological foundation of Hans Ipsen's “Wirtschaftsburger”, as an economic status or cate-
gory in the internal market, to an “Arbeitskraftunternehmer” in a European market society.
As a result, the establishment of Union citizenship might have disconnected the right to equal treatment from the
individual's economic category in the internal market, but that right has not been disconnected from the individual
duty to prove value by active economic or social presence.123 As has been pointed out by others, the shift has clear
normative implications as it develops an understanding of “good” and “bad” citizens and extends less rights to the lat-
ter.124 Especially, it arouses suspicion towards those Union citizens who are perceived to resist responsibilities to inte-
grate, escape from marginalisation or invest in themselves to become self‐sufficient, instead empowering those who
are “agile and adaptable” by relieving them from dependence on received social bonds and hierarchies.125 Questions
of “justice” or “fairness” between the mobile and immobile classes in the European Union126 are resolved through the
moral virtue of economic responsibility, with EU “social” citizenship obscuring, rather than replacing, class antago-
nisms and commodification processes.127
This shift in economic personhood towards a model that facilitates a mode of government centred on the
individual's strategic deployment of his/her human capital could be situated within the broader transformation of
European political economy and the politics of European integration. Although the European Commission has always
been a front‐runner in the so‐called “social investment paradigm”, presenting it in 2013 as the “key” to emerge from
the crisis “stronger, more cohesive and more competitive”,128 this agenda has recently been pursued in the context of
what has been called the broader mutation of the European constitution.129 In a discourse stressing the need for
macroeconomically “balancing” an increasingly heterogeneous euro area, the future success of Economic and121AsThym eloquently points out, it requires an “output‐oriented assessment that links citizens' rights to the degree of integration”. D.
Thym, ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens’ (2015) 52
Common Market Law Review, 17, 38.
122Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Brey, para. 81. What is at stake probably resonates even more strongly in other languages,
like in Dutch (“economische draagkracht”) and German (“wirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit”).
123Neuvonen, above, n. 3, at 97.
124Thym, above, n. 121, at 38.
125Respectively, Barbou des Places, above, n. 107, at 199, and A. Somek, ‘Alienation, Despair and Social Freedom’, in Azoulai et al.,
above, n. 3, at 52.
126As extensively explored by De Witte, above, n. 108.
127O'Brien, above, n. 2, at 1676–1681.
128L. Andor, Looking Forward: Social Investment as a Way out of the Crisis, Speech at Eurofound Forum on Social and Employment Pol-
icies for a Fair and Competitive Europe, Dublin, 15 February 2013. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press‐release_SPEECH‐13‐
128_en.htm (accessed 31 August 2016). The momentum towards a “Social Investment Pact” had built up gradually, with public intel-
lectuals from academia and Brussels‐based think tanks starting a renewed push for this perspective since 2011. See F.
Vandenbroucke, A. Hemerijck and B. Palier, ‘The EU Needs a Social Investment Pact’, OSE Opinion Paper, Issue 5, 1–25.
129A.J. Menéndez, ‘Editorial: A European Union in Constitutional Mutation?’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal, 127.
KRAMER 187Monetary Union (EMU) has been made dependent on the effectiveness and “performance” of national labour markets
and welfare systems, a process described as the ambition to “earn a social triple A”.130 According to the European
Commission, a vast amount of research done by international organisations highlights that “modern social policy
should rely on investment in human capital […] so as to enable people to live a decent life, change personal and
professional statuses over lifetime and make the most of their talent.”131 As Dani observes, transformational pres-
sures on national welfare states deriving from the EMU guide a social policy reorientation towards enhancing the eco-
nomic qualities of the individual, employing governmental resources to prompt an anthropological turn with respect to
the individual, who is increasingly pressured to envision herself as an entrepreneur.132 From an, admittedly, stylised
perspective, it could therefore be claimed that where EU free movement law has made the model of
Arbeitskraftunternehmer constitutive for the enjoyment of EU rights, EMU made its very “survival” dependent on a
reframing of its constitutional subjects in this direction.5 | CONCLUSION
“According to the Immigration Office I cannot prove that I will not become a burden on the social services in Belgium.
But are they able to prove that I will become a burden? I have had a literary translation company for 13 years, I work
hard. I do not abuse the system at all. I have never relied on social assistance, and I have never had any encounter with
the OCMW [‘Public Service for Social Welfare’].”133 So were the words of a Dutch literary translator residing in Bel-
gium who was notified that he had insufficient income to stay and faced deportation in the summer of 2013. In the
Netherlands, the standard letter listing 25 questions sent by the immigration authority to Union citizens who apply
for social assistance culminates in the question: “why do you think that you do not constitute an unreasonable burden
on the public resources?”134 Both examples spectacularly illustrate the aim of the article, which is essentially to dem-
onstrate that the homo economicus, albeit in a new form, is as relevant for the study of EU free movement law as ever.
It is submitted that the question of whether EU free movement has moved beyond “market citizenship” requires tak-
ing account of the internal transformation of its anthropological foundation, the model of personhood constructed by
economic liberalism, i.e. the homo economicus.
During the early stages of European integration, when the European Communities governed Europe as an entity
of economicmechanisms, its legal subjects enjoyed instrumental freedoms that enabled them as workers to respond to
the mechanisms of expansion and contraction of economic production in the European market space. The image of
the early European mover resonates with the homo economicus of classical liberalism: (s)he was governed as a rela-
tively passive partner of laissez‐faire, a production factor responding to the economic mechanisms of demand and sup-
ply that extend beyond him/her as an individual. Contemporary free movement law, by contrast, rather targets the
mobile Union citizen him/herself on the basis of an anthropology of the human being of neoliberal economics: it seeks
to govern through the individual's human capital, (self‐)investments in the form of life choices and potential returns to
both him/herself and “society”. This image becomes especially clear in the case law intersecting at mobility and wel-
fare, where prior socio‐economic conduct and contribution and prospective economic productivity have increasingly
come to inform decisions on whether the Union citizen has chances to engage in “genuine economic activities” or has
(or will) become an “unreasonable burden” on the social assistance system. Here, we witness the discursive possibility
in EU law for migrating individuals to establish links with a particular society and to carry a certain “economic130J.C. Juncker, ‘The Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union’. Retrieved on 31 August 2016 from
https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta‐political/files/5‐presidents‐report_en.pdf, at 8.
131European Commission, COM(2016)127, 8 March 2016, at 4.
132Dani, above, n. 26, at 72–75.
133De Volkskrant, ‘Ik kwam in een gigantische mallemolen terecht’, [translation from Dutch], 20 February 2014.
134Letter in possession of author.
188 KRAMERcapability”, elements that are made constitutive for an authoritative judgment by national authorities, national
judiciaries and, ultimately, the European Court, on their legal status under EU law.
Rather than a “reduced functional concept of the individual” serving the practical realisation of a European
market, the “new” homo economicus of free movement serves as a rational frame for the government of the European
mover on the basis of a mutual responsibility between the Union citizen and his/her host Member State towards
social and economic activity, self‐sufficiency and integration. In this sense, the shift in economic personhood
identified in EU free movement law resonates with broader efforts in the wider constitutional transformation of
the EMU to restructure the relation between the individual and the national welfare state towards the strategic
deployment of human capital. It confirms the interpretation that EU law not only functions as an instrument to
remove barriers to the free movement of its citizens and a constitutive force of a borderless Europe, but also facili-
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